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I. INTRODUCTION

In the context of company law, the term "ultra vires" is normally used
to describe acts that are beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation.'
Rules concerning ultra vires acts of companies have changed in recent
years in mainland China,2 Taiwan and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong"). It appears that in all of these parts of Greater
China,3 the legal frameworks are now rather similar to each other and seem
to resemble the rules that are applied in the Macau Special Administrative
Region ("Macau"). 4 This, of course, provokes questions: what are the reasons for these seemingly synchronized legislative developments, given the
different political, economic and legal systems of these areas in Greater
China? In particular, can any conclusion be drawn in regard to attempts to
harmonize lawmaking in the region, or do the reasons for the aforementioned changes follow a global trend? 5
The ultra vires doctrine was originally developed in the common law
world but has ceased to be popular in many of these jurisdictions. 6 Consequently, it is further interesting to inquire if (1) the reasons for abandoning
the doctrine are the same in the West and in the Far East, and (2) if this
means anything for the significance of the ultra vires doctrine.
This article is divided as follows. Part II will briefly introduce the historical development and function of the ultra vires doctrine in the Western
world. Part III is devoted to the discussion of the development and current
status of the legal framework governing ultra vires acts of corporations in
the different parts of Greater China. Part IV will carry out an analytical
comparison of the legislative approaches taken towards ultra vires acts of

1 For details see infra Part 11.
2The term "mainland China" is used to refer to the People's Republic of
China
("P.R.C."), excluding the territories of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau
Special Administrative Region and Taiwan.
3See Xian-chu Zhang, The Practiceof "One Country, Two Systems " in the Economic
Integrationof Mainland China and Hong Kong: Review and Prospects, 35 KOBE U. L. REV.
103, 118 (2001).
4 The common origin of the different areas of Greater China makes it particularly interesting to compare their historical legal development, which will be discussed infra Parts
Ill(A)(1), IIl(B)(l), IllI(C)(1), and Il(D)(1), without a need to justify the selection of compared jurisdictions. Compare, e.g., Marieke Oderkerk, The Importance of the Context: Selecting Legal Systems in Comparative Legal Research, 48 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 293, 303

(2001).

5For discussion of tendencies to establish standardized company law regimes in capitalist
jurisdictions, see Bernhard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEo. L. J. 439 (2000); John Gillespie, TransplantedCompany Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis of Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 641,passim (2002).
6 For details see infra Part I1.
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companies in Greater China and the West. Part V will address final remarks.
II. THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE

In a broad sense, the Latin expression "ultra vires" is used by lawyers
to describe acts which have been conducted "beyond the legal powers of
those who have purported to undertake them.",7 As indicated above, 8 in the
context of company law, "ultra vires" normally stands for acts which are
beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation as they are described in the
corporation's foundation documents, such as a memorandum of association,
the articles of association, or by the law governing its establishment and operation. 9

During the 19th century, courts in common law' 0 jurisdictions developed the rule that ultra vires acts of companies were void due to the lack of

7 PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW
8 See supra Part 1.

202 (6th ed. 1999).

675 (1986); DAVIES, supra note 7, at 202;
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 518 (2d ed. 1985); Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of CorporateIllegality, 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1283, 1302 (2001); Stephen Griffin, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Rule in Corporate Law, at http://www.solent.ac.uk/law/mjls/papers/griffen.htm (last visited Sept. 12,
2003); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 66 (1996);
STEPHEN W. MAYSON ET AL., COMPANY LAW 72 (17th ed. 2000); VANESSA STOTT, HONG
9See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

LAWRENCE

KONG COMPANY LAW

45 (9th ed. 2000). Sometimes, however, the term ultra vires is also

used for acts of representatives of a company who exceed their authority. See, e.g., DAVIES,
supra note 7, at 203; Nicholas C. Howson, China'sCompany Law: One Step Forward,Two
Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127, 150 (1997); Klaus Vorpfeil &
Robert J. Wieder, Vertretungsbefugnis und Legitimationspriifungbei englischen Kapitalund Personengesellschaften [Legitimacy Checks for English Capital-and Personal

Companies] 41

RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT

[hereinafter RIW] 285, 288

(1995). Unlawful acts of companies are sometimes called "ultra vires" as well. See, e.g.,
DAVIES, supra note 7, at 203; TONY KHINDRIA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDIA 94

(1997).
10Here "common law" shall mean the English law applied in Commonwealth countries.
For discussion of the meanings of the term "common law," see SHARON HANSON, LEGAL
METHOD 34 (1999); ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 22-23

(1939); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 670 (1999). Many continental European civil law countries
have not and do not apply the ultra vires doctrine. See, e.g., Klaus-Peter Hess, Der "ultravires"-Grundsatz im britischen Gesellschaftsrecht [The "ultra-vires"-principleunder
British company law] 38 RIW 638 (1992);

KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT

[COMPANY LAW] 183 (2d ed. 1991) (regarding ultra vires in Germany); Karsten Schmidt,
Ultra-viresDoktrin: tot oder lebendig? [Ultra-vires-Doctrine:dead or alive?] 184 ARCHLY
FOR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 529, 530 (1984). Other European jurisdictions had developed
structures similar to the ultra vires doctrine. See, e.g., HANS T. SOERGEL & ALEXANDER
LODERITZ, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [CIVIL CODE] VOL. 10 Art. 10 No. 18 (12th ed. 1996)

(regarding France and Belgium).
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legal capacity" of the respective company. 12 Morover, these acts could not
be ratified, even by unanimous vote of the shareholders.1 3 The reason for
the establishment of this rule was to prevent "trafficking in company registration" and to protect shareholders and creditors by guaranteeing that the4
capital of a company be used only for its known and declared business.'
The limitations of corporate power under the ultra vires doctrine also reflected "distrust of corporate power and the desire to constrain the15corporation's ability to accumulate socially threatening economic power."'
The business world was, of course, not always satisfied with the restrictions imposed by the ultra vires rule and successfully invented ways to
circumvent it. This was done by (1) drafting the objects clause (the passage
of the memorandum of association that defines a company's scope of business) as widely as possible, and, (2) when the courts reacted by distinguishing the powers from the objects and applying the ejusdem generis rule of
construction, to include a clause according to which the company had the
power "to carry on any other trade or business whatsoever which can, in the
opinion of the board of directors, be advantageously carried on by the company in connection with or as ancillary to any of the above businesses or the
general business of the company.' 6 As a result of these developments, it
" SIMON GOULDING, COMPANY LAW 156 (2d ed. 1998).
12

The landmark decision in England was Ashbury CarriageCo. v. Riche, L.R. 7 H.L. 653

(1875) (Eng.). See DAVIES, supra note 7, at 203; GOULDING, supra note 11, at 156;
HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 66, 590; MAYSON et al., supra note 9, at 73. In the United
States, for example, a Maryland court decided that a contract with a company which had
been incorporated to operate steamboats between Baltimore and Fredericksburg was void
because the contract involved improvements of the waterway beyond Baltimore. See Abbott
v. Baltimore & Rappahannock Steam Packet Co., I Md. Ch. 542, 549-550 (1850);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 518-19 ("Once, nothing was so central to the legal nature of corporations as the doctrine of ultra vires."); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L. J. 201, 209 (1990).
13GOULDING, supra note 11, at 156; Millon, supra note 12, at 209.

14DAVIES, supra note 7, at 203; GOULDING, supra note 11, at 157; Greenfield, supra note

9, at 1283, 1302-1309, 1305-1306
("[T]he agency costs inherent in the difference between shareholder interests and management interests are currently kept in check by numerous legal and non-legal mechanisms. These legal duties
and market protections did not exist to anywhere near the same degree during the time at which the
ultra vires doctrine was at its peak .... In a context where management's legal and non-legal incentives to look after the interests of the shareholders were low by modem standards, the doctrine of ultra vires made eminent sense to shareholders.").

Millon, supra note 12, at 218.
15Id. at 209; see also GREENFIELD, supra note 9, at 1302-04.
16See Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Props. Ltd., 2 Q.B. 656, 656 (Eng. 1966); DAVIES,
supra note 7, at 204; GOULDING, supra note 11, at 158; Hamilton, supra note 9, at 68. For
developments in the United States, see Friedman, supra note 9, at 519 and Millon, supra
note 12, at 219.
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was felt that any value the ultra vires doctrine might have had with regard
to shareholders' or creditors' protection was destroyed; "it became instead

merely a nuisance to the company and a trap for unwary third parties." 17 In
addition, once the rule that managers have the legal duty to protect shareholder interests was acknowledged, it was no longer necessary to limit the
use of shareholder capital by applying the ultra vires doctrine; on the con-

trary, this could be counterproductive by restraining managers from taking
advantage of all possible business opportunities. 18 Consequently, the rule
was abolished in many common law countries.' 9 In particular, in the United
States, the ultra vires doctrine had become basically insignificant in all

states by 1930.20 Legal scholars have observed that this development was
17 DAVIES, supra note 7, at 204; Friedman, supra note 9, at 519 ("The corporate firm was

the chosen form of American enterprise. Ultra vires was nuisance, and an obstacle to corporate credit. The doctrine had to go."). See also GOULDING, supra note 11, at 157;
Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1284, 1310.
18GOULDING, supra note 11, at 1313 ("Once better mechanisms came along, the costs of
the ultra vires doctrine simply outweighed its benefits, and the doctrine fell away.").
19HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 68 ("[T]he modem trend has been to eliminate this doctrine from the law of corporations, or at least to sharply restrict its availability."). In England, recommendations for a reform were made as early as 1945. See GOULDING, supra note
11, at 159. The abolition of the ultra vires rule was finally carried out by the Companies Act
1989. See DAVIES, supra 7, at 207-11 (discussing the preceding European Communities Act
1972 and its significance for the Companies Act 1989). See also GOULDING, supra note 11,
at 159; MAYSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 640; Mark Williams & Jianhua Zhong, The Capacity of Chinese Enterprises to Engage in Foreign Trade: Does Restriction Help or Hinder
China's Trade Relations?, 8 J. TRANSITIONAL L. & POL'Y 197, 220-21 (1999); Vorpeil &
Wieder, supra note 9, at 288. Section 35 of the Companies Act 1989 now reads as follows:
(1)The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the ground of lack
of capacity by reason of anything in the company's memorandum.
(2) A member of the company may bring proceedings to restrain the doing of an act which but for
subsection (1)would be beyond the company's capacity; but no such proceedings shall lie in respect of an act done in fulfillment of a legal obligation arising from a previous act of the company.
(3) It remains the duty of the directors to observe any limitations on their powers flowing from their
company's memorandum; and action by the directors which but for subsection (1), would be beyond the company's capacity may only be ratified by the company by special resolution. A resolution ratifying such action shall not affect any liability incurred by the directors or any other
person; relief from any such liability must be agreed to separately by special resolution.
In addition to the ultra vires rule, the Companies Act 1985 also abolished the doctrine of
constructive notice, according to which any third-party was presumed to know the contents
of the foundation documents of a company. GOULDING, supra note 11, at 161.
20 Millon, supra note 12, at 212; see also Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1312. Most states
in the United States have, in principle, adopted statutes patterned on § 7 of the Model Act
1950. See HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 68. Section 7 of the Model Act 1950 was also the basis for § 3.04 of the Model Business Corporation Act 1984, which reads as follows: "The validity of a corporate action may not be challenged on the ground that the corporation lacks or
lacked power to act." See HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 68-75; CLARK, supra note 9, at 67576 ("In the United States, it is now a problem that is largely of historical interest."); but see
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closely linked to the reconceptualization of the corporation-state relationship through the gradual rejection of the idea that a corporation is artificial
in nature and possesses only such powers as the state has conferred upon
it. 21 Instead, the corporation's origin
was seen more and more in the natural
22
activities of private individuals.
III. THE LEGAL FATE OF ULTRA VIRES ACTS OF COMPANIES IN GREATER
CHINA
A. Mainland China
1. General

On September 29, 1949, three days before the official establishment of
the People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.") on the Chinese mainland, the
communist government abolished all laws previously in force under the Nationalist government of the Republic of China.23 All business organizations
were eventually nationalized or collectivized over the next ten years. 24 After the chaos which occurred during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
the Chinese legal system 25 and the corporate system were reestablished in
1978.26

Greenfield, supra note 9, passim (arguing that the ultra vires doctrine remains vibrant insofar as companies are not authorized to act unlawfully); compare REUBEN A. REESE, THE
TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

(Fred B Rothman & Co.

1981).
21Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1305, 1311-12 (also with regard to the "state competition
for corporate charters"); see also Millon, supra note 12, at 211-12.
22 Greenfield, supra note 9, at 1312; Millon, supra note 12, at 211-12, 218.
23 See GeneralPrinciplesof the PoliticalConsultative Conference of the Chinese People,
in ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU FALING HUIBIAN [COLLECTION OF LAWS AND DECREES OF
THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT] 1949-1950 (Zhongyang renmin zhengfu fazhi wei-

yuanhui ed., 1950), art. 17; see also William K. Kirby, China Unincorporated. Company
Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 56 (1995);
Ulrich Manthe, BurgerlichesRecht und BiirgerlichesGesetzbuch in der Volksrepublik China
[Civil Law and Civil Law Code in the People's Republic of China], 28 JAHRBUCH FOR
OSTRECHT 11, 16 (1987).

24 Kirby, supra note 23, at 56.
25 It is debatable whether the mainland Chinese legal system belongs to the civil law family or to the common law family or if it has an entirely unique character. However, mainland
Chinese law is not based on case law but on statutory law. See Lutz-Christian Wolff& Bing
Ling, The Risk of Mixed Laws: The Example of Indirect Agency under Chinese Contract
Law, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 174, 176 (2002).

26 This was done on the basis of a historical decision regarding the liberalization of the
mainland Chinese economy. See Manthe, supra note 23, at 17 n.26 (referring to the text of
the decision in Feiqing yuebao [Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly, Taibei]). See also
Williams & Zhong, supra note 19, at 99.
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Since then, the P.R.C. company law has "developed backwards., 1
The lawmaking process did not start with a general company law on the basis of which rules regarding particular questions could have been drafted.

On the contrary, special laws governing enterprises with foreign investment
("FIEs ''28) were enacted first in order to attract foreign direct investment
and the "import" of urgently needed modem technology from the industrial-

ized western countries. Later, the establishment and operation of domestic
forms of private enterprise was gradually allowed, and specific laws governing these new business vehicles were enacted. 29 The FIE-legislation and

the laws covering privately-owned domestic enterprises supplement an in30
state-owned enterprises
comprehensive set of rules governing
S 31 so-called

and collectively-owned enterprises, which had mainly been set up during
the above-mentioned reform activities in the 1950s.
32
On July 1, 1994 the Company Law of the People's Republic of China
("P.R.C. Company Law") was enacted.33 The P.R.C. Company Law is supposed to provide basic rules for all enterprises (including FIEs), which have

27 Lutz-Christian Wolff, P.R.C. Company Law: 'One Country, Many Systems'?, HONG

KONG LAWYER, Mar. 2001, at 37, 39. See also R.H. FOLSOM & J.H. MINAN, LAW IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 449-461 (1989).
28 Namely equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign owned enterprises.
29 See Interim Provisions on Privately Owned Enterprises, effective as of July 1, 1998,
CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS § 12-546 (CCH 1988). For enterprises without legal
person status, see Law on the People's Republic of China on Individual Sole Investment Enterprises, effective as of Jan. 1, 2000, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS § 13-502 (CCH
1988); compare with Mao Baigen, Wholly Individually-owned Enterprises Leap Forward,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 1997, at 19 [hereinafter CHINA L. & PRACTICE]; see also Andrew
Halper et al., Partnership Enterprises Law Breaks Limited New Ground, CHINA L. &
PRACTICE, Apr. 1997, at 19-21; Williams & Zhong, supra note 19, at 198.
30 See ProvisionalRegulations of State-Owned IndustrialEnterprises,effective as of Apr.
1, 1983, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, supra note 29 § 13-500; Law of the People's
Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, effective as of
Apr. 13, 1988, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, id.§ 13-534; Howson, supra note 9, at
129; Deborah K. Johns, Reforming the State Enterprise PropertyRelationship in the P.R.C.:
The Corporatizationof State-owned Enterprises, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 911, 914-28 (1995).
31See P.R.C. Urban Collective-owned Enterprise Provisions, effective as of Jan. 1, 1992
(P.R.C.); P.R.C. Rural Collective-owned Enterprises Provisions, effective as of July 1, 1990
(P.R.C.); see also FOLSOM & MINAN, supra note 27, at 457-461; Chuan R. Peng, Limited Liability in China: A PartialReading of China's Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN
L. 263, 264-65 (1996).
32 See Roman Tomasic & Jian Fu, Company Law in China, COMPANY LAW IN EAST ASIA
135, 143-52 (Roman Tomasic ed., 1999); Kirby, supra note 23, at 56-57.
33The P.R.C. Company Law was last amended Dec. 25, 1999. See Wang Bai, National
People's Congress Reviews, Adopts Amendments to Corporation Law, CHINA LAW, Feb.
2000, at 63-65; Company Law of the People's Republic of China, CHINA LAW FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS, supra note 29, § 13-518.
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been established 34as, or converted into, limited liability companies or joint
stock companies.
2. Ultra Vires Rules in MainlandChina

For a long time, the legal fate of companies that engaged in ultra vires
acts was somewhat unclear in mainland China. Many laws and regulations
governing the establishment and operation of entities with legal person
status required that the foundation documents, i.e., the agreement on the establishment of the company and/or the articles of association, defined the
scope of business 3 5 of the respective entity. 36 This is particularly true for
FIEs. 37 The P.R. C. Company Law3 8 summarizes the situation in Article 11,
paragraph 2 as follows:
34 See Peng, supra note 31, at 267-70; Tomasic & Fu, supra note 32, at 155-56. Until
today, however, in addition to the basic rules of the P.R.C. Company Law, many special laws
and regulations exist providing for diversified rules for different company-types based on the
nature of the shareholders, thus creating a complicated corporate system which is rather unclear and inefficient. See Wolff, supra note 27, at 37; Coleen Lau, New Company Law
Paves the Way for M&A, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 1996, at 16 (calling it "confusing and
fast-changing company law"). C. Y. Leung, New FIE Registration Rules Add Little Clarity,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 1996, at 28; see generally, Xian Chu Zhang, PracticalDemands
to Update the Company Law, 28 H. K. L. J. 248 (1998).
35 The scope of business clauses under P.R.C. company law are similar to what would be
called objects clauses in common law jurisdictions. BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA
136 (2002); GUIGUO WANG & ROMAN TOMASIC, CHINA'S COMPANY LAW: AN ANNOTATION

18(1994).
36 See, e.g., Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic
of China Governing the
Registration of Legal Corporations,promulgated on June 3, 1994, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS, supra note 29 § 13-542, arts. 9, 13; Administrative Rules of the People's Republic
of China Regarding the Registration of Companies, promulgated on June 24, 1994, CHINA
LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, supra note 29 § 13-568, arts. 9, 19; Howson, supra note 9, at
150 ("Chinese legal and organizational culture is fixated on the precise limitations described
in a given entity's 'business scope,' such that no enterprise is authorized to undertake an activity not specifically delineated and authorized in an approved scope.").
37 Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, latest
version effective as of March 15, 2001, CHINA LAWS ON FOREIGN BUSINESS, supra note 29, §
6-500, art. 10; Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of
Chinaon Sino-ForeignCooperative Enterprises, latest version effective as of Oct. 31, 2001,
CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, supra note 29 § 6-550, art. 11(2), 13(2), 55; Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign
Cooperative Enterprises,effective as of Sept. 4, 2001, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS,
supra note 29, § 6-105, art. 12(2), 13(2), 36; Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-OwnedEnterprises, latest version
effective as of Dec. 4, 2001, CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS, supra note 29, § 13-507,
art. 11, 14(3), 15(2), 45; Ministry of ForeignEconomic Relations and Trade, Contracts and
Articles of Association of ForeignInvestment EnterprisesExamination and Approval Principles and Items of Examination, promulgated on Oct. 5, 1993, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Feb.
1995, at art. 2(5). It is understood among foreign investors and their legal advisors that special attention should be paid to the drafting of related scope of business clauses in order to
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The scope of business operations of a company shall be stipulated in the company's articles of association, and shall be registered in accordance with the
law. Projects within the scope of business operations of a company, that are
restricted by the
39 laws or regulations, shall be subject to approval in accordance
with the law.
Moreover, several laws and regulations provide that legal entities are
only allowed to act within their registered scope of business. 40 All these
regulations, however, fail to explicitly address legal acts which are not covered by the scope of the business of a company, in particular if ultra vires
contracts concluded in the name of a company are valid or not.4 1

avoid unnecessary restrictions on one hand and to be as specific as required in order to obtain the necessary state approval. See Judith Crosbie, Editor's Note, CHINA L. & PRACTICE,
Feb. 1995, at 43-44. All FIE projects are subject to approval by designated state authorities.
For new developments regarding the approval practice, see Li Xiaoyang, DecentralizedApproval of Encouraged FIE Projects, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Mar. 2000, at 44-45; Andrew
McGinty & Fang Jian, MOFTEC Changes FIE Approvals: Headway or a Headache?, CHINA
L. & PRACTICE, Mar. 2000, at 49-60; Jun Wei & Stephen Curley, ProvincialApprovals of
Foreign Investment Clarfed, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, July-Aug. 2001, at 71; Tarrant M. Mahony, New Investment Catalogue Expected to Liberalize InfrastructureInvestment, CHINA L.
& PRACTICE, Jan. 2002, at 107.
38 See Bai, supra note 33.
39 See Tomasic & Fu, supra note 32, at 156 ("Presumably, this is to be interpreted as introducing an ultra vires doctrine into Chinese Company Law."). For the requirement of a
definition of the scope of business of limited liability companies and joint stock companies
in their articles of association, see Company Law of the People's Republic of China, supra
note 33, at arts. 22(2), 79(2) (respectively). FIEs in particular are not allowed or are restricted to certain industries. See Mahony, supra note 37, at 107; see generally, Mitch
Dudek & Alex Wang, China's Accession to the WTO: Ready and Willing... But Able?,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Dec.-Jan. 2002, at 18-21; Xinchao Tong et al., Investing in a Distribution Channel: Current Legal Framework and Implications after WTO, CHINA L. &
PRACTICE,
40

Jan. 2002, at 31-35.

See e.g., GeneralPrinciplesof Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, effective

as of Jan. 1, 1987, CHINA

LAWS FOR FOREIGN

BusINEss, supra note 29, § 19-150, art. 42 ("A

corporation shall operate within its approved and registered scope of business."), 49(1) (providing administrative and criminal liability for enterprise representatives who are responsible
for any ultra vires acts in the name of the company); Company Law of the People 's Republic
of China, supra note 33, at art. 11,
3 ("A company shall conduct operational activities
within the registered scope of its business activities. If a company revises its articles of association pursuant to legal procedures and an amendment to its registration is carried out
with the company registration authority, the scope of a company's business operation may be
amended."). See also Administrative Regulations of the People'sRepublic of China Governing the Registration of Legal Corporations,supra note 36, at art. 13; Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China Regarding the Registration of Companies, supra
note 36, at art. 19.
41 See GeneralPrinciplesof Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, supra
note 40,
at art. 49(1) (stipulating that the legal representatives of an enterprise that is a legal entity are
subject to administrative and criminal liability "in addition to the liability borne by the legal
person." The extent to which the enterprise entity is subject to contractual or pre-contractual
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Until 1997, it was widely assumed that ultra vires acts of companies
were void. 42 Published decisions of mainland courts 43 as well as several judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People's Court pointed in this
direction. 4 Furthermore, this position seemed to be supported by some
statutory stipulations under which civil acts that violated the law or public
interest were void.45 In the early 1990s, however, the Chinese judicia 7
started to take a more liberal approach to ultra vires acts of companies.
Several courts held that ultra vires contracts of corporations were not necessarily invalid.4 7 Also, in 1993, the Supreme People's Court stated that
contracts violating administrative regulations (such as contracts which are
outside the respective scope of business) should not be regarded as void
unless they violate
special sales, operational
rights, or
statutory prohibi•
,,
,,48
tions, or if the contract concerned "unsellable goods.
However, especially in the field of foreign trade and investment law, this new trend in
P.R.C. court practice was widely ignored.
The remaining uncertainty was partly abolished by the Interpretation
49
to Questions Concerning the Application of the P.R.C. Contract Law
liability, however, was not clear.); see Howson, supra note 9, at 150 ("Thus, it is somewhat
surprising that the Company Law does not provide for any protection of third-parties acting
in good faith, where a company or its directors or officers are acting ultra vires or beyond
their scope of authority.")
42GUIGUO WANG, WANG'S BUSINESS LAW OF CHINA 105-10 (3rd ed., 1999); Stefanie
Tetz, Neues Vertragsgesetz in China: Was andert sich fJr ausldndische Vertragspartner?
[New ContractLaw in China: What is Being Changed with Respect to Foreign Contract
Parties?]RIW at 647-649 (1999) ("Contracts with Chinese parties, who do not have foreign
trade rights or whose scope of business does not cover the contract are without doubt void.").
See also, WANG & TOMASIC, supra note 35, at 18.
43 See Case Digest, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Jan. 1992 at 17; WANG, supra note 42, at 110
(In the past, decisions of mainland courts were not published on a regular basis; however,
that practice is changing).
4PSee LING, supra note 35, at 137 n.138.
45 People's Republic of China Foreign Economic Contract Law, art. 9, available at
www.isinolaw.com/jsp/law/LAW_Statutes.jsp, repealedby People's Republic of China Contract Law, [hereinafter P.R.C. Contract Law] (Oct. 1, 1999) ("Contracts which violate national laws or interests of the P.R.C. are void."); see also General Principlesof Civil Law of
the People's Republic of China, supra note 40, art. 58(5).
46LING, supra note 35, at 137.
41 See id. at 137-38.

48 Supreme People's Court, Summary of the Minutes of the National Symposium on Economic Adjudication Work (May 6, 1993), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FALU QUANSHU: ZENGBIANBEN [COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE P.R.C.: SUPPLEMENT] 137, 139

(Huai
49 et al. eds., 1994).
See P.R.C. Contract Law, supra note 45. The P.R.C. Contract Law itself failed to address the issue explicitly. However, Article 52 stipulates that a contract is void if it violates
mandatory provisions of laws or administrative regulations. Id. at art. 52. Whether or not
the rules, which require companies to act only within the scope of their business, are to be
regarded as "mandatory" in the sense of Article 52 was not clear. For a general discussion of
the P.R.C. Contract Law, see Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of
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("Contract Law Interpretation")" which was promulgated by the P.R.C.

Supreme People's Court on December 19, 1999 and entered into force on
December 29, 1999. Article 10 of Chapter 3 of the ContractLaw Interpretation reads as follows:
A People's Court shall not declare a contract void for the reason that it is entered into by the parties beyond their business scope, except for those contracts
involving business the operation of which is restricted by the State, subject to
license by the State or prohibited by laws and administrative regulations.

This stipulation is commonly understood as having abolished the ultra
vires doctrine, i.e., that ultra vires acts of companies are now in Brinciple

valid as far as third party dealings of' companies are concerned.
Some
Chinese legal writers have suggested that the legislative change was caused
by the transformation of the Chinese economic system into a "market oriented economy," that the costs for rigidly adhering to the registered scope
of business were too high, and that "too many' 53contracts would be voided
and that creditors would face great uncertainty."

It must be emphasized at this point, however, that especially in the area
of foreign direct investment, many restrictions still exist. This is particularly true with regard to specific industries. 54 It must be assumed that ultra

China's Contract Law, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. I (1999); Wolff& Ling, supra note 25; Lam

Ling Wo, China Unveils Unified ContractLaw, INT'L FIN. L. R., June 1999, at 17-22; Lam
Ling Wo, Scrutinizing the Contract Law, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1999, at 59-62; Randall Peerenboom, A Missed Opportunity?, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1999, at 83-87; Hugh
T. Scogin & Brett D. Braude, New ContractBasics, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan. 1999, at 36-41;
WANG SHENGMING ET AL., AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE P.R.C. CONTRACT LAW, (1999); Tetz,
supra note 42; WANG, supra note 42, at 56-168; Nan Wang, The New P.R.C. ContractLaw,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Oct. 1998, at 42-46; GUANGHUA YU & MINKANG Gu, LAWS
AFFECTING BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN THE P.R.C. 10-38 (2001); E. Anthony Zaloom &
Hongchuan Liu, China's ContractLaw Marks a New Stage in Commercial Law Drafting,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1999, at 15-18.
SOYunfei Chen, Interpretingthe P.R.C. Contract Law, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Mar. 2000,
at 40-42.
51 Interpretation to Questions Concerning the Application of the P.R.C. Contract Law, entered into force on Dec. 29, 1999 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter ContractLaw Interpretation], ch. 3,
art. 10 (referring only to the validity of contracts; it can only be assumed that non-contractual
ultra vires acts are treated in the same way).
52See LING, supra note 35 at 138; Yu & Gu, supra note 49, at 19 (without
reference to
the ContractLaw Interpretation).
53See Yu & Gu, supra note 49. For the fact that information on the legislative history of
P.R.C. law is normally not publicly available, see LING, supra note 35.
54The main legal basis for these restrictions are the Directing of Foreign Investment Tentative Provisions, entered into force June 12, 1995 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Directing Provisions]. According to the Directing Provisions, industries are grouped into encouraged,
restricted, permitted and prohibited foreign investment categories. The DirectingProvisions
are supplemented by Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue 2110/02.03.11
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vires acts of companies that reach into those restricted areas are still void
despite the clarification provided by the ContractLaw Interpretation. The
situation is, however, not totally clear. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the
legislative clarification by the Contract Law Interpretation regarding the
fate of ultra vires acts of companies can already be seen as a safe indicator
for a complete liberalization of the private business sector, 55 since state control over the scope of business of companies is for the time being maintained.56 However, it can be expected that any future steps in direction of
the liberalization of the mainland Chinese economy will give impetus to
further reduction of the existing restrictions.
B. Hong Kong

1. General
On December 19, 1984, the governments of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the P.R.C. signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong 57 ("Joint Declaration"). In accordance with the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong became part of the P.R.C. on
July 1, 1997, after having been a British colony for more than 150 years.58
The economic and legal system of Hong Kong, however, will remain unchanged for a period of at least fifty years after the handover 59 under the

[hereinafter Catalogue], the first version of which became effective with the Directing Provisions, the latest version on Apr. 1, 2002. CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 2002, at 37-69. The
Catalogue specifies in more detail the business types that fall into the different categories.
Lucile Barale, Is MOFTEC Imposing Stricter Controls on the Approval of Foreign Investments?, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1997, at 32-35; Hongchuan Liu, The Revised Foreign
Investment Catalogue: Groundfor Optimism?, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 2002, at 23-25;
Kenneth Lu, The New Catalogueand MOFTECApproval ofEncouragedEnterprises,CHINA
L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 2002, at 115; Randall Peerenboom, The New Foreign Investment
Guidelinesand Market Reform in China, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Apr. 2002, at 19-22.
55 As suggested by Yu & Gu, supra note 49, at 19.
56For the phasing out of industry-related restrictions for FIEs after China's WTOaccession, see Dudek & Wang, supra note 39, at 18-21; Dennis Hie Hok Fung, Setting Up
Joint Ventures in China: Will the Problems DisappearAfter China'sAccession to the WTO?,
in CHINA AND THE WTO 111-27 (David Smith & Guobin Zhu eds., 2002); Mahony, supra
note 37, at 107; Tong et al., supra note 39, at 31-35.
57 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/trans/jd/ (last visited on Sept. 13, 2003).
58ANNE CARVER, HONG KONG BUSINEss LAW 10 (5th ed. 2001).
59

See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion of the People's Republic of China, art. 5, [hereinafter HK Basic Law] available at http://www.info.gov.hk/
basiclaw/fulltext (last visited Sept. 13, 2003) (the "socialist system and policies shall not be
practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years"). See also CARVER, supra note 58,
at 9. The situation is commonly referred to as the "one country, two systems" concept. Id.
at 6-7.
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concept of "one country, two systems" 60 according to6 1 which, Hong Kong
became a Special Administrative Region of the P.R.C.
Hong Kong's legal system is based on English law. 62 The major
source of Hong Kong's company law is common law,63 and the principles
of equity are supplemented by a rather developed statutory framework. The
most important piece of legislation in this area is the Companies Ordinance
("HKCO"), 64 which was first enacted in 1865 .65
2. Ultra Vires Rules in Hong Kong
Before 1997, the HKCO required companies to specify their objectives
of association. 66 Acts of a company 67 not covered by the
in a memorandum
objects clause were regarded as ultra vires and void without any possibility

60

See Judith H. Krebs, One Country, Three Systems? JudicialReview in Macau After Ng

Ka Ling, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 111, n.1 (explaining legal aspects of the "one country,
two systems" concept with regard to the economic integration of mainland China and Hong
Kong), see also Zhang, supra note 3, passim (an excellent study of the topic).
61 The legal basis for the establishment of Special Administrative Regions was created in
1982 through an amendment of the P.R.C. Constitution. Article 32 now reflects the idea of
"one country, two Systems" and reads as follows:
The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in light of special conditions.
See also Krebs, supra note 60, at 112.
62 HK Basic Law, supra note 59, at art. 8 ("The laws previously in force in Hong Kong,
that is the Common Law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary
law, shall be maintained, except for those which are inconsistent with this law or have been
amended by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."). For a
summary of the development of Hong Kong's legal system, see CARVER, supra note 58, at
10-15; for legal aspects of the economic integration of mainland China and Hong Kong, see
Zhang, supra note 3, at 106-110 and passim. English law is applied as far as suitable to the
local circumstances of Hong Kong. CARVER, supra note 58, at 12.
63I.e., the body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions. For the different meanings of the term "common law," see supra note 10.
64Companies Ordinance, at http://www.justice.gov.hk/Home.htm (last visited
Sept. 28,
2003) (hereinafter referred to as "HKCO").
65There are also non-statutory regulations such as the Codes on Takeover and Mergers
and Share Purchases, available at http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/bills/html/codes guide/
jan02takeovers/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
66The memorandum of association is one of the founding documents of a company. See
HKCO, supra note 64 §§ 4 (1), 15. The others are the articles of association (non-essential
for companies limited by shares) and a statutory declaration of compliance with all the requirements of the Companies Ordinance. HKCO, supra note 64 §§ 9, 11, 15, 18(2).
67 Pursuant to the HKCO "[a]ny 2 or more persons, associated for any lawful purpose
may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association.., and otherwise complying with the requirements of this Ordinance in respect of registration, form an incorporated
company, with or without limited liability." HKCO, supra note 64 § 4 (1).
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of the company ratifying and thereby validating such an act.68 In line with
common law tradition, 6 this limitation on companies' ability to operate7 °
was supposed to serve two major goals: (1) it was meant to protect the
creditors of the company by allowing the company to use its assets only for
the purposes covered by the objects clause or reasonably incidental to those
objects, and (2) it was intended to protect the company's shareholders who
had invested in a business of a specific nature, which should not be changed
without their consent.7 1
Again, like in other common law countries, the strict application of the
ultra vires doctrine in Hong Kong had caused much criticism. 72 However,
it was only in 199773 that the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 199774
changed the ultra vires rule. 75 The HKCO now provides that the use of an
objects clause is optional. 76 Even if a company chooses to define its objectives, corporate acts which are not covered by the objects clause are not
necessarily void, as stipulated by section 5B of the HKCO, which reads as
follows:

68 PearlIslandHotel Ltd. v. Li Ka-yu, 2 H.K.L.R. 87 (1988); STOTT, supra note 9, at 45.
Actual notice of the objects of a company was of no relevance, since a company's memorandum was open to inspection by any person. Everyone was, therefore, deemed to have constructive notice of the objects. Id. at 50.
69Here, "common law" means the English law applied in the Commonwealth countries.
For the different meanings of the term "common law," see supra note 10.
70 STOTT, supra note 9, at 45.
71Dirs. of the Ashbury Ry. Carriage& Iron Co. v. Riche, 7 L.R. 653, 667 (H.L. 1875);
STOTT, supra note 9, at 46.

72 In particular, it was argued that it was easy to circumvent the rule by "listing the objects at great length," STOTT, supra note 9, at 47-49; GRIFFIN, supra note 9. By way of a liberal construction, to interpret an ultra vires contract as an exercise of express or implied
powers, see Attorney Gen. v. Dirs. of the GreatE. Ry. Co., 5 L.R. 473, 478 (H.L. 1880), or to
authorize the company to extend the objects, see Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Props.Ltd., 2
L.R. 656 (Q.B. 1966).
73 In England, the ultra vires doctrine in relation to third party dealings was abolished by
the Companies Act 1989. See supra note 19; GRIFFIN, supra note 9.
74 In force since Feb. 10, 1997. STOTT, supra note 9, at 46.
75
1d. The Second Report of the Hong Kong Companies Law Revision Committee (paragraph 2) had suggested following section 35(1) of the English Companies Act and section
117(2) of the Australian Corporations Act, where the objects clause is optional. The 1992
Ninth Report of the Hong Kong Standing Committee on Company Law Reform recommended taking an approach towards ultra vires actions of companies similar to that taken by
the Canadian Business Corporation Act 1982 as amended. See ROMAN TOMASIC ET AL.,
BUTTERWORTHS HONG KONG COMPANY LAW HANDBOOK 42-43 (3d ed. 2001).
16 HKCO § 5(1A)(a)(i) states: "The memorandum of any company may state the objects
of the company," available at http://www.justice.gov.hk/Home.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2003). However, the memorandum of an association that intends to be registered under
HKCO § 21(1) without the word "limited" or related characters in its name, must have an
objects clause. HKCO § 5(1A)(a) available at http://www.justice.gov.hk/Home.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 2003); TOMASIC, supra note 75, at 42-43.
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(1) A company(a) whose objects are stated in its memorandum77 shall not carry out any
business or do anything that is not authorized by its memorandum to carry on
or do;78 or
(b) shall not exercise any power which is expressly excluded or modified
by its memorandum or articles, contrary to such exclusion or modification.
(2) A member of a company may bring proceedings to restrain the doing
of an act in contravention of subsection (1); but no such proceedings shall lie
in respect of an act to be done in fulfillment of any legal obligation arising under a previous act of the company.
(3) An act of a company (including a transfer of property to or b' the
company) is not invalid by reason only that it contravenes subsection (1).7
With the introduction of subsection (3) of section 5B HKCO, the ultra
vires doctrine was finally abolished in Hong Kong. The main reason for
such abolition was the need to protect innocent third parties who might otherwise suffer in their dealings with a company that had acted beyond its
listed powers. 80
C. Taiwan
1. General
After having been under Japanese control prior to 81 and during World
War II, Taiwan came under Chinese rule again in 1945.82 The communist
victory on the Chinese mainland in 1949 forced the government of the Republic of China ("ROC"), which had been in power on the mainland until
84
then,8 3 and 2 million of its followers, to "relocate" to Taiwan.
In princi85
today.
Taiwan
in
force
in
remain
ROC
the
of
laws
the
ple,

77 Where a company does not state the objects in its memorandum of association, "[a]
company has the capacity and the rights, powers and privileges of a natural person." HKCO
§ 5A (1), available at http://www.justice.gov.hk/Home.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2003). It

"may do anything which it is permitted or required to do by its memorandum or by any enactment or rule of law." HKCO, supra note 64, § 5A (2); see also TOMASIC, supra note 75,
at 43.
78 TOMASIC, supra note 75, at 43.
79Id.
80 TOMASIC, supra note 75, at 44.

81 China had ceded control of Taiwan to Japan after its defeat during the Sino-Japanese
War (1894-95). Gregory Klatt, Taiwan, in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF EAST ASIA 505 (Alan S.
Gutterman & Robert Brown, eds., 1997); Neil Andrews & Angus Francis, Company Law in
Taiwan, in COMPANY LAW rN EAST ASIA 219 (Roman Tomasic, ed., 1999).

Klatt, supra note 81, at 505; Jane Kaufman Winn, Banking and Finance in Taiwan:
The Prospectsfor Internationalizationin the 1990s, 25 INT'L LAW. 907, 910 (1991).
82

83

See discussion supra Part Ill(A)(1).
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The Taiwanese legal system is a statutory system,8 6 which is modeled

after the laws of other countries, most importantly Germany and Japan.
More recently, the Taiwanese system has been influenced by Anglo-U.S.
common law and commercial practice . 7 It also contains elements of tradi-

tional Chinese law 88 and thus "reflects a complex heritage."89 The ROC
Company Law is the major source 90 of the formation, organization,
opera9
tion and dissolution of incorporated business entities in Taiwan. '

84 Klatt,

supra note 81, at 505; Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 219; Chiu,

LEGAL

(John T. McDermott, ed., 1991). Taiwan then had about six million inhabitants. Id. at 219. The whole
population has grown to an estimated number of 22,603,001 as of July, 2003. See CIA, The
World Factbook 2003, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/tw.html (Aug. 1, 2003).
85 Klatt, supra note 81, at 505; Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 220; Chiu,
supra
note 84, at 47; Manthe, supra note 23, at 16; see also CIA, supra, note 84. The Taiwanese
government claims to represent the whole of China. However, most countries in the world
recognize the government of the P.R.C. as the only legitimate representative of China, including Taiwan.
o
86Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 220-21 ("overlaid on imperial Chinese law").
87 Id. at 221-23; Chiu, supra note 84, at 48.
ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT AND TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 44 ,47

88 Klatt, supra note 81, at 510-11; BAKER & MCKENZIE et al., INVESTITIONSFOHRER

TAIWAN [INVESTMENT GUIDE TAIWAN] 32 (2000); Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 221

("Despite the introduction of Western codes and courts, the 3000-year-old Chinese legal system has remained significant").
89Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 219 ("intricate interplay of these disparate legal
traditions").
90 Klatt, supranote 81, at 521; see Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 222.
91The ROC Company Law was first promulgated on Dec. 26, 1929 and entered into effectiveness on Feb. 21, 1931. Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 227. The ROC Company Law was largely based on the Ordinance Concerning Commercial Associations
[Gongsi tiaoli] which had been put in force in 1914 on the basis of the Commercial Law of
1904. See Kirby, supra note 23, at 43, 51. A substantial revision of the ROC Company Law
was carried out in 1946, in order to "assist in the accumulation of capital for the expansion of
the industry, to take over Japanese-owned industry and to attract foreign investment following the relinquishment of extraterritoriality by China's war-time allies." See Andrews &
Francis, supra note 81, at 228; for background, in particular for United States involvement.
See also Kirby, supra note 23, at 53-56. The ROC Company Law was often revised (nine
times between 1966 and 2001), but retained the "essential features of the 1929 and 1946
laws, which placed an emphasis on regulatory controls." Id.at 57. According to Article 2,
the ROC Company Law allows for four different company forms as follows: (1) unlimited
companies, Articles 40-97, (2) unlimited companies with limited liability shareholders, Articles 114-127, (3) limited liability companies, Articles 98-113 and (4) companies limited by
shares, Articles 128-356; see also Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 235-36; Klatt, supra
note 81, at 521; JAMES CHENG, DOING BUSINESS IN TAIWAN 65-67 (1989); KIM S. JAP, TAXES
AND INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN 9 (1990). Due to tax reasons, the first two forms are rarely used

in practice. Klatt, supra note 81, at 521.
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2. Ultra Vires Rules in Taiwan

As a statutory requirement, the articles of incorporation of Taiwanese
companies have to define the respective company's scope of business.92
The articles require governmental approval as a precondition for the incorporation of the company.93 In the past, approval was often only granted for
a limited number of activities. 94 It has been suggested that one of the main
reasons for these restrictions was the historical fact that the ROCgovernment, which was dominated by those who had come to Taiwan from
the mainland after 1949, 9' mistrusted the local population and tried to limit
commercial freedom by granting "entry rights to a lucrative oligopoly" only
to those who proved to be cooperative and loyal.9 6 In response to the tight
government control, Taiwanese businessmen often refrained from registering their businesses as companies. 97 In the 1980s, however, a process of
liberalization started. Today, it is assumed that in practice, except for businesses that require special approval,98 everyone is free to set up a company
for most types of business activities without being hindered by government
authorities, in particular during the process of registering the company. 99
Until November 12, 2001, Taiwanese companies were expressly forbidden from conducting business that was not covered by their approved
scope of business.' 00 The related sentence 1 of Article 15 of the ROC Company Law reads as follows: "A company shall not engage in any business
outside the scope of its registered business."'10 The Ministry of Economic

92

ROC Company Law, supra note 91, at arts. 41, 101, 129.

93Id. at arts. 6, 387; see Klatt, supra note 81, at 536; JAP, supra note 91, at 9; see gener-

ally R.O.C. CIV. CODE, arts. 30, 32, 47, 48. For special requirements in cases of foreign
investment, see Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 236.
94Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 229. In order to engage in different business sectors, different companies had to be set up with different business scopes. Id.; Kirby, supra
note 23, at 57.
95Chiu, supra note 84, at 115; Winckler, supra note 82, at 8; see supra Part III(C)(1).
96 Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 230; Chiu, supra note 84, at 115-31; Kirby, supranote 23, at 51, 57; Kaufman Winn, supra note 82, at 908, 944.
97Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 230; Kirby, supra note 23, at 58; Kaufman
Winn, supra note 82, at 916. In 1998, it was reported that up to forty percent of the Taiwanese economy was carried out underground. Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 230.
98For example, banks.
99Information obtained from Taiwanese scholars. A search did not yield any recent empirical data supporting this assumption or a continuing restrictive exercise of approval powers by Taiwanese authorities.
00

1 KE FANGZHI, GONGSIFA YAOYI [ESSENTIALS OF COMPANY LAW] 13 (1995) ("For this

reason, a company's legal capacity is restricted by its objects."). But see WANG TAIQUAN,
XIN XIUXHENG GONGSIFAJIEYI [ANALYSIS OF THE NEW REVISION OF THE COMPANY LAW] 26

(Lai Yuanhe et al. eds., 2002); Kirby, supra note 23, at 57.
0' This version has been in force since Nov. 15, 2000 and is available at http://
www.trade.gov.tw/english/wto/wtolaw_07.htm (last visited on Sept. 28, 2003).
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Affairs ("MOEA") has the power to order a company to cease02 any ultra
vires activity, fine the directors and even dissolve the company.
Despite the fact that sentence I of Article 15 of the ROC Company
Law 10 3 is widely regarded as a reflection of the ultra vires doctrine in Taiwan,104 no express stipulation exists which declares ultra vires acts of com06
understood that in general,1
panies void.10 Consequently, it is commonly
07
ultra vires acts of companies are valid. 1
On November 12, 2001, the ROC Company Law was again revised.
The above-quoted sentence I of Article 15108 was deleted. The official reason for this change was that in order to be in line with the concurrent

102

ROC Company Law, supranote 91, at art. 10,

3, which reads as follows:

Where a company has committed any act in violation of the laws and regulations or its Articles of
Incorporation to the extent affecting its normal operation, the authority may order the company to
take corrective measure(s) within a given time limit. In case the company fails to take corrective
measure(s) within that time limit, its responsible person shall be liable to a fine of not less than NT$
6000 but not more than NT$ 30,000, and the authority may set another time limit and order the company to take corrective measure(s) upon expiry of the said time limit, the central authority may, ex
officio or upon report by the local authority, order the dissolution of the company. Notwithstanding
the foregoing provisions, the central authority may, ex officio or upon report by the local authority
concerned or application by an interested party, give a direct to dissolve the company if the violation
of the laws and regulations or Articles of Incorporation is serious in nature.

See also Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 229, 232 ("... makes the company a hostage
to the relevant authority and the MOEA").
103 This is true for the current version of the ROC Company Law, supra note 91, as well
as for the previous version, supra note 102.
104 WANG TAIQUAN, supra note 100, at 20.
t05 KE FANGZHI, supra note 100, at 16.
106 On the basis of ROC Company Law, supra note 91, at art. 15, sentence 2, it is as-

sumed, however, that lending of a company's capital shall not be legally effective. See KE
FANGZHI, supra note 100, at 15. The wording of Article 15, sentence 2, is, however, not totally clear: "Unless inter-company activities call for capital loan, the capital of a company
shall not be lent to any of the shareholders of the company nor to any other person." See

also ROC Company Law, at art. 16:
A company, unless otherwise authorized by other laws or provided in its articles of incorporation to
provide guaranty for others, shall not act as a guarantor in any way whatsoever. The responsible
persons of a company acting in violation of the aforesaid provisions shall personally bear the responsibility of such guaranty and shall be severally subject to a fine not exceeding NT$60,000 and shall
be liable to the company for loss which may have been sustained by the company therefrom.
107 KE FANGZHt, supra note 100, at 15; WANG TAIQUAN, supra note 100, at 20-21 (The
person acting on behalf of the company must reimburse the company for any damages). See
also ROC CIVIL CODE, supra, note 91, at art. 107 ("The limitation and withdrawal of the
delegated authority shall not be a valid defense against a bonafide third party unless the ig-

norance of the third party is due to its own fault." This provision is, however, not dealing
with the legal capacity of a company, but with the scope of authority of agents).

108 ROC Company Law, supra, note 91.
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amendment of Article 18 ROC Company Law,' 09 the business activities of a
company should not be restricted, except that the scope of business should

be clearly formulated in its articles."

°

It appears that the abolition of sen-

tence 1 of Article 15 ROC Company Law also underlined the previously accepted understanding according to which corporate ultra vires acts of

Taiwanese companies are not void."'

Consequently, like in many other

civil law jurisdictions,"12 the ultra vires rule has never gained any signifi-

cance in Taiwan."13
D. Macau
1. General
On the basis of the Sino-PortugueseJoint Declarationon the Question

of Macau 1 4 signed by the Portuguese government and the government of
the P.R.C. in 1987, Macau was "returned" to the P.R.C. on December 20,
1999 and became a Special Administrative Region on the basis of Article

32 of the P.R.C. Constitution. 1 5 Macau had been a Portuguese colony for
109 See id at art. 18:
Companies engaged in the same category of business, no matter whether they are of the same class
of company [or] whether they are located in the same province (municipality) or locality, shall not
use the same or a similar corporate name. Where two companies engaged in different business are
using the same corporate name, the company with later registration shall include in its corporate
name distinctive word or words. Where the corporate names of two companies are separately distinguished by different categories of business, their corporate names shall be deemed not identical or
similar.
Where the name of a company indicates the category of business, unless there is any other law or
regulation, then its registered scope of business shall not be restricted by such indication.
See also

1-3 of the amended version of art. 18:

Companies shall not use the same or similar corporate name. Where the corporate names of two
companies are separately distinguished by different categories of business or where the characters of
the name allow for such differentiation, they shall be deemed to be not identical or similar.
Apart from the fact that the business should be clearly formulated in the articles of the company the
operation of a company should not be otherwise restricted.
110 WANG TAIQUAN, supra note 100, at 21.
111See the text accompanying note 91.
"2 For the impact different foreign jurisdictions have had on the development of Taiwan's
legal system see supra Part Ill(C)(1).
113 See supra Part Il(C)(2).
114 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau, at http://
www.cri.com.cn/english/ncrispecial/macau/jointd/index.html (last visited Jun. 11, 2002);
see also Krebs, supra note 60, at 114-15.
115 For attempts of the Portuguese government to pass control of Macau to the P.R.C. at a
much earlier stage, see Krebs, supra note 60, at 115, 112-24; Zhang, supra note 3, at 119120.
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the previous 442 years." 6 Similar to the related provisions of the Hong
Kong Basic Law, 17 the Macau Basic Law'"8 provides that laws in force
prior to the handover shall be maintained for a period of fifty years." 9
Due to its colonial past, Macau follows the civil law tradition. 20 For a
very long time, Macau's company law simply followed Portuguese legislation. Originally, Macau's business law was based on the Portuguese
Commercial Code, which was first enacted in 1888.121 Prior to the handover in 1999, however, it was felt that Macau should have its own codification of corporate rules.' 22 In 1989, the Macau government entrusted a
Portuguese expert with the preparation of the draft of a Macau Company
Code. 3 The draft, which was completed in 1990, never became law, but
was used by the Macau lawmakers as a basis for company-law-related
stipulations contained in the Macau Commercial Code,' 24 which became
law on November 1,

1999.125

Krebs, supra note 60, at 111.
See Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 59.
118 Macau Basic Law, available at http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/main.html (last
116
117

visited May 5, 2003).
19 See id at arts. 5, 8, 18; but cf id. at arts. 13, 14 (stating that the central P.R.C. government is, however, in charge of foreign and defense affairs). For the differences between
the Basic
Law of Macau and Basic Law of Hong Kong, see Krebs, supra note 60, at 124-26.
0
12 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION To COMPARATIVE LAW 108-09 (3d

ed. 1998) (stating that Portugal is a civil law country with a statutory legal system.). See
Tetley, supra note 10, 683 ("[c]ivil law" shall be understood as the Roman Law-influenced
continental-European legal systems). For the differences between civil law and common
law, see ZWEIGERT & KOTZ at 261-71; Tetley, supra note 10, 707-12; Basil Markesinis,
Reading Through a Foreign Judgment, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN
CELEBRATION OF JOHN FLEMING 260-283 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); C.

Gordon Post, Stare Decisis: The Use of Precedent, in READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
19-31 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 2d ed., 1993); POUND, supra note 10, at 57-62;
Krebs, supra note 60, at 128.
2' LENG TIEXUN, AOMEN GONGSI,

DIREITO DAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIAIS DE MACAU

[MACAU COMPANY LAW] 8-9 (1999).

122 Id. at 9-10; See also Localisation of the Laws, at http://www.macau99.org.mo/tdmrtp/
varios/legacy e.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
123TIEXUN, supra note 121, at 9.

124 C~digo

Comercial de

Macau

[Macau

Commercial

Code],

at

http://

www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/pt/default.asp#dpri (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
125 TIEXUN, supra note 121, at 10; Macau Commercial Code, supra note 124, §§ 331-472.
Under the rules of the Macau Commercial Code, the following company types are available:
(1) unlimited company, §§ 331-347; (2) mixed liability company by quotes or by shares, §§
348-355; (3) limited liability company by quotas or by sole owner, §§ 356-392; (4) limited
liability company by shares, §§ 393-472. See also C&C-Advogados, How to Setup a Company, at http://www.ccadvog.com/htsac.htm (last visited May 5, 2003).
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2. Ultra Vires Rules in Macau
As it is the rule in other parts of Greater China, Macau companies are
126
required to specify the scope of business in their articles of association.
It is therefore assumed that the legal capacity of Macau companies is limited to activities covered by the scope of business so defined. 27 However,
no express statutory rule exists which declares ultra vires acts of companies
invalid. On the contrary, limitations of a company's legal capacity cannot
be used against innocent third parties as indicated by paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 236 of the Macau Commercial Code, which read as follows:
(1) Companies have to accept the validity of activities which have been carried
out by the members of its administrative organs towards third parties in the
name of the company and which are within the scope of the powers granted by
the law, notwithstanding the fact that the powers of its representatives have
been limited in the articles of association or if the representatives' powers have
been limited by way of shareholders' resolution and it is irrelevant if such resolution has been published or not.
(2) But, if it can be proved that the third party knew or according to the situation ought to have known that the related activity is not in line with the stipulations of the articles of association, and there is no express or implied
shareholder's resolution that the company will be responsible for this activity,
the company may hold the limitations of the representative's powers as stipulated 12in8 the articles or as due to the nature of the business against a third
party.
The above provisions do not directly address a company's legal capacity.
Instead, they deal with the limitation of the legal power of a company's representatives. As a matter of principle, acts towards bonafide third parties
are valid even if they are not covered by the respective companies' business
scope. 1' The ultra vires doctrine as such was never applied in Macau.

IV.

HARMONIZED ABOLITION OF THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE IN GREATER

CHINA?

A. Coordinated Legislative Action?
As demonstrated above, due to the legislative changes between 1997
and 2000 in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, the ultra vires doctrine has practically disappeared in all parts of Greater China. 30 It is inter126 Macau CommercialCode, supra note
127TIEXUN, supra note 123, at 32, 34-35.

124, at § 179(5)(b).

128 Macau Commercial Code, supra note 124, at § 236(1-2).

129 See discussion supra Part III(D)(2).
1 o But see supra Part III.A.2, at 12 (discussing mainland China).
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esting to note that within a rather short period, a legislative harmonization
has taken place in the region despite the different political, economic and
legal systems in the various areas. This could suggest that there has been
some kind of joint legislative action. The idea of a (secret) coordination of
legislative activities within Greater China, intriguing as it is, however, is
not realistic due to the ongoing political tensions between mainland China
and Taiwan. 131 Furthermore, despite the discussion about Greater China's
economic and legal integration,32 there is no evidence of any coordinated
legislative action regarding the abolition of the ultra vires-doctrine. In contrast, the remaining statutory differences in the various parts of Greater
33
China indicate that no joint legislative approach has been taken.'
B. Transplanted Legislative Action?
Due to the trend of internationalization and globalization, lawmakers in
any jurisdiction study (and copy) foreign legal systems when creating new
laws and/or when taking legislative action to improve the existing legal
framework. 134 But, again, there is no evidence that the disappearance of the
ultra vires doctrine in Greater China was the result of any such "legislative
chain reaction", i.e., no evidence exists that any of the lawmaking bodies of
the various parts of Greater
China copied one another in relation to the re35
cent legislative changes.

131Cf Zhang, supra note 3, at 118-19.

For recent developments, see Jason Blatt, Chen

Dismiss Direct-Links Overture, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 8, 2002, at 7; Jason Blatt,
Qian Offers Taiwan 'Concession,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 2002, at 1; Jason Dean,
Taipei's Change in China Stance Raises Tensions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2002, at 1;
Mark O'Neill & Jason Blatt, Chen on Path to Disaster, Warns Beoing, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 6, 2002, at 1; John Tkacik, Taiwan's Hornet Nests, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2002, at A9.
132 Zhang, supra note 3, at 123. For example, Macau lawmakers, practitioners and academics mentioned in discussions with the author that it is being considered to bring Macau's
company law in line with the company law of Hong Kong in order to facilitate investment
opportunities. Also, there is much discussion about the establishment of a Free Trade Zone
between southern parts of mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau, and possibly a future
opening to Taiwan. Bill Savadove & Joe Tang, A Day of Milestones for Integration, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27, 2003; Christian A. W. Schulz, Free Trade Zones at the Beginning of the 21s Century, 35 COMP. & INT'L J. S. AFR. 198, 198-215 (2002). For the recent
establishment of a free trade zone between Hong Kong and mainland China under the Closer
Economic PartnershipArrangement, at http://www.tdctrade.com/cepa/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2003).
'33 See supra Parts Ill(A)(2), IllI(B)(2), I11(C)(2),
IIl(D)(2).
34 Esin Orficii, A Theoretical Framework for Transfrontier Mobility of Law, in
TRANSFRONTIER MOBILITY OF LAW 5, 7 (Robert Jagtenberg et al. eds., 1995); Black, supra

note 5; Gillespie, supra note 5, at 642-46; William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (11):
The Logic of Legal Transplants,43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 489-510 (1995); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5; Wolff& Ling, supra note 25, at 174.
135For the "borrowings" of Hong Kong legislators, see supra note 75.
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C. Mono-Causational Legislative Action?
If, in the same region, legislative activities take the same direction
without having been coordinated, it could be assumed that the same reasons
have caused such synchronized lawmaking. A closer look at the recent developments regarding ultra vires legislation in the different parts of Greater
China, however, reveal that the immediate legislative rationale was rather
different.
First, just as in line with Macau and its civil law legacy, the ultra vires
rule was never applied in Taiwan, despite that tight government control
over Taiwanese corporate activities 136 was maintained for a long period of
time over registration and approval requirements. The recent amendments
of the ROC Company Law did not therefore abolish the ultra vires rule, but
have (at most) clarified the existing situation.
Secondly, while the actual reasons for the abolition of the ultra vires
rule in mainland China 137 are not completely clear, 138 it is necessary to keep
in mind that the ultra vires rule never obtained any express "statutory blessing" on the Chinese mainland. Its prior application appears to have been a
side-effect of governmental attempts to control corporate activities. 139 With
the development of a more elaborate civil and business law in mainland
China, the private-law 140 feature of these administrative 14 1 restrictions of
corporate activities became apparent. It had to be decided if ultra vires acts
by companies should not only be punished with sanctions by government
organs, but should also bear consequences at the private law level. In reaction, ultra vires acts of companies were viewed to be void. The recent abolishment of the ultra vires rule in principle demonstrates that the (indirect)
state control of corporate business activities on a private law level is no
longer regarded as essential. It also signifies that the private law-related
function of the ultra vires rule, i.e., the protection of stakeholders in companies, 42 has been (or at least is in the process of being) taken over by a

136

Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 226-227, 229; Chiu, supra note 84, at 113;

Johns, supra note 30, at 924-26; Peng, supra note 31, at 274.
137 See supra Part Ill(A)(2).
138 Compare with Ling, supra note 35.
139 For the traditionally tight control of business activities by Chinese governments, see
supra Part IiI(C)(2); Andrews & Francis, supra note 81, at 219, 226-27, 229; Chiu, supra
note 84, at 44; Peng, supra note 31, at 274; Johns, supra note 30, at 924 ("culture of state intervention"). Williams & Zhong, supra note 19, at 198, 222 (explaining a "deep-rooted belief that strict control equals good order").
140 "Private law" as the law governing the civil relationships among individuals, associations and corporations excluding criminal law, administrative law and constitutional law.
141 For the traditionally strong public-law character of mainland China, see LUTZCHRISTIAN

WOLFF,

DAS

INTERNATIONALE

WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT

DER

[INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW OF PEOPLE'S REI'ULIC OF CHINA], 80 (1999).
142

See supra Part I1.
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more sophisticated43set of rules for the protection of a company's shareholders and creditors.1
Finally, the reasons for the abolition of the ultra vires rule in Hong
Kong are completely different and follow the trend of other common law
countries. 144 The ultra vires rule ceased long ago to be an effective instrument for the protection of shareholders and creditors of a company in Hong
Kong as well. 45 The developments detailed above had made this goal unachievable. 46 The rule became a "theoretical nuisance value" and "an outdated Victorian legacy," which placed unnecessary burdens on the
contractual capacity of corporations. 114847 The abolishment of the ultra vires
doctrine was therefore long overdue.
V. CONCLUSION

The ultra vires doctrine can be regarded as a simple and effective tool
to exercise state control over business activities of companies on the one
hand 149 and to protect the interests of (private) stakeholders in companies on
the other hand. 50 However, with the development of liberalized markets,
as well as a more refined response of legislators to the demand for protection of concerned parties, it loses its justification.' 5 1 Accordingly, in recent
years, the ultra vires rule has ceased to play any major role in all of Greater
China despite the fact that no synchronized lawmaking has taken place.
However, in Greater China, the rise and downfall of the ultra vires doctrine
143 For the development of mainland China's legal system in general see supra Part
Ill(A)(1). The protection of creditors is in mainland China achieved by the P.R.C. Contract
Law, supra note 45, and supplemented by other laws on more specific issues, e.g., the P.R.C.
Security Law, promulgated on June 30, 1995 and effective as of Oct. 1, 1995, CHINA L. &
PRACTICE, Aug. 1995, at 21-36 (English and Chinese) and CHINA BANKING & FIN., Sept. 18,
1995, at 9-16 (English). See also Robert Caldwell & Xu Xiangmin, Editor's Note, CHINA L.
& PRACTICE, Aug. 1995, at 36-44; Robert Caldwell & Xu Xiangmin, Taking and Enforcing
Security in China Under the New Security Law, CHINA BANKING AND FINANCE, Aug. 25,
1995, at 1-7; Edward Epstein, et al., 1995 BUTTERWORTH'S J. OF INT'L BANKING & FIN. 457,
457-59 (1995); Paul Vout, Taking Security in China, 4 ASIAN CLR 125, 125-32 (1998); Y.L.
Elaine Lo, Security Provision Rules Give Government Tighter Control Over Lending Issue,
CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Jan. 1997, at 34-39; Yan Lan, et al., Several Issues Concerning the
Application of the 'P.R.C. Security Law' Interpretations,CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Feb. 2001,

at 24-47 (English and Chinese; promulgated by the Supreme People's Court on Dec. 8, 2000
and effective as of Dec. 13, 2000); A. Godwin & Zhou Lili, JudicialInterpretation on the
P.R.C. Security Law, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, Feb. 2002, at 20-23.
144 Supra Part Ill(B)(2).

"45 See supra Part Il(B)(2).
146 See id.

47 Griffin, supra note 9, at 11.
1 Supra Part III(B)(2).
'49 See supra Part 111(B)(2).
50 See supra Part III(B)(2).
"' Supra Part II.
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(and similar legislative instruments) was and is closely linked to the intended level of state control over the activities of companies and the degree
of sophistication of the legislative protection of private stakeholders in
companies. 5 2 In this respect, the history of the ultra vires doctrine in the
West has repeated itself in Greater China.

152 Supra Part IV(B).

